Public Policy 101
The 2001 No Child Left Behind Act – comprehensive policy analysis
Name: Michelle Lee
SUID: 05611374
Introduction
The No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 has made a profound impact on the federal education system. Passed with bipartisan support by a Republican Congress and signed by enthusiastic President Bush on January 2002, the law has impacted how every public school classroom in the country operates and interacts with the children. It is most definitely a controversial policy – a reform yes, but with mixed results. Some have criticized it as a “washed down reconciliation policy”, and “an unrealistic and all-too-ambitious policy,” whilst others have praised it as “a revolutionary education reform” and “a truly impactful bipartisan effort.”
This essay will examine the no child left behind policy from a number of perspectives. It aims to look at how the No Child Left Behind policy was formed, and passed in Congress, who was responsible for the details, as well as who was responsible for its making onto the decision agenda.
This policy analysis will consist of three sections:
The first section will examine why and how the NCLB policy managed to appear on the decision agenda. The NCLB policy adheres to political scientist Kingdon’s model of how a policy is able to appear on the decision agenda: the problem stream, the political stream and the policy stream, must come together. This section argues that 1) the amalgamation of the three streams was only made possible by changes in the political stream, and
2) newly elected president George Bush’s was an influential policy entrepreneur who contributed greatly to bringing the policy onto the agenda.
The second section will examine the role of academics and intellectuals played in the policy formation and making process of the NCLB policy. One inevitably comes to this conclusion after examining the structure of the policy and how it was created. More specifically, it will be argued that much of the failures of the NCLB policy can be attributed to the excessive dependence of politicians on the information and research provided by academics and intellectuals during the bill’s drafting process.
The third section will examine the role of institutions in the policy making process, in particular, how congressional procedures and practices known as unorthodox decision making helped to shape the NCLB act. It will be argue that whilst unorthodox decision making procedures contributed to the quick and efficient assessing of the bill through congress, and ensured that the momentum of enthusiasm and dedication towards the bill was not lost, it also gave way to much reconciliation.
Section 1: The decision agenda
Title: A new president, a crisis, and a novel education policy
The “No Child Left behind” act fits Kingdon’s model of how a policy appears on the decision agenda: namely, a problem stream, a political stream and a policy stream came together. A change in the political stream, in the form of a change in the presidential administration, and an unforeseen crisis, opened the policy window and was the most influential in bringing the “No Child Left Behind (NCLB)” act to the decision agenda. Without a change in the political stream, the coupling of the three streams would have been impossible. President George W. Bush was the policy entrepreneur who brought together the three streams, and successfully placed the education reform policy on the decision agenda.
The problem was evident: the quality of public education in America was not only “hitting rock bottom”1, but it was “atrocious2.” Standards of public school education in America were not high enough, and it was impacting the minority, and the socioeconomically disadvantaged youth most severely. By 2001 it was reported that more than 13% of all 17 year olds in America were functionally illiterate, and this figure was as high as 40% in minority youth1. Teacher quality was reportedly deteriorating, and many schools did not have adequate funding or resources to provide students with the individualized attention they needed2. School curriculum was reportedly becoming diluted and lacking a central purpose and as a result a significant proortion of students switched over from vocational and college prepatory programs to “general track” courses3.
Despite the evident presence of the problem, policy window to the NCLB act however, only opened as a result of changes in the political stream. Policy windows are “opportunities for action on given initiatives…and affects the decision agenda.4” Kingdon claims that “a change of administration is probably the most obvious policy window.5” Accordingly, in dealing with the policy window for the NCLB act, the first change in the political stream that took place was a change in the administration from the democratic Clinton administration to the republican Bush administration. Accompanying the change in administration was the “honeymoon period”, during which the public has more faith and enthusiasm for the president, the media is more forgiving of his mistakes, and bi-partisan cooperation is more possible. Bush’s promise of education reform had been a central part of his presidential campaign during 2000, and as a result of his public support for education reform, the problems of the national education system and the need for reform became nationalized issues. Immediately after taking office, on January 23 2001, Bush sent his NCLB plan to Congress and requested the congress to engage in bipartisan cooperation and debate for the sake of education reform6. Furthermore during his address to the joint session of Congress held on February 27th 2001, he chose to place focus on the issue of education reform, declaring that “the highest percentage increase in our budget should go to our children’s education. Education is my top priority7”. Any policy proposed has a stronger chance of being passed during the “honeymoon period.” Regardless of party affiliation, the arrival of a new president instills hope in people that the bleak, gridlocked outlook on the political arena will change. This sense of hope even politicians belonging to ideologically divergent parties are willing to compromise, work together, and come to a solution about the numerous issues surrounding America. Consequently, the fact that the No Child Left Behind act was the first piece of policy that Bush had proposed during his honeymoon period alone, made it highly likely that the end result would be successful.
Changes in the political stream, effectively manipulated by the policy entrepreneur lead to the coupling of the problem stream and the political stream. Aforementioned, because Bush, the policy entrepreneur of the NCLB act, chose to focus so extensively on education reform during the honeymoon period of his presidency, the problem became a widely publicized one which the public took great interest in. Baumgartner &Jones argue that “policy entrepreneurs are able to swiftly manipulate elite and mass opinion towards a surge of enthusiasm for the new policy.8” In Bush’s case, he effectively developed mass public enthusiasm during the honeymoon period of his presidency9 through a number of means. Firstly, he delivered a number of highly publicized speeches at the start of his presidency, highlighting the importance of bringing about quick and efficient education reform, and making promises to do so. Perhaps the most notable example would be the State of the Union Address he had made in January, in which he outlined the main focus points of his education reform, namely teacher accountability, bridging the achievement gap between children of different socioeconomical and racial backgrounds, and allowing parents greater choice over the school their children attend. Such publicized appearances allowed him to narrow down the general mood of enthusiasm in the air (due to the honeymoon period) and direct it towards a single policy: the No Child Left Behind Act. Bush then manipulated this enthusiasm to couple together the political stream and the problem stream. As mentioned in Baumgartner &Jones, “when issues reach the public agenda on a wave of popular enthusiasm…political leaders react by doing whatever they can to provide support… for the sake of their personal gain they will invest their resources – time, effort, money... 1” The public’s expectations pressured to the politicians to respond to the desire for education reform and bring about change appropriately – for whilst they may be faithful partisan members, first and foremost, politicians are responsible for the happiness of their constituents, and must live up to their expectations. The education problem had always been present , but as a result of the changes in the political stream, the coupling of the two streams was possible because politicians now had an incentive to discuss and consider the education reform policies for the sake of pleasing their constituents and appealing to public opinion.
Another change in the political stream was a significant shift in public opinion towards Bush as a result of how Bush acted in response to the September 11 2001 terrorist attacks. Previously, by July, he had an average approval rating of 63% according to a CNN/US Today Poll11 [in response to the question: Do you approve or disapprove of the way George W. Bush is handling his job as president?] However, by October, this figure had spiked up to 88% according to a poll conducted by Time and CNN12, when the same question was asked by Time/CNN. His general approval ratings spiked as a result of people’s respect and praise for how promptly and quickly Bush had responded to the terrorist attacks and managed foreign policy. This figure continued to remain high, and by December when his NCLB act was passed by both house and senate, his approval rating was still remaining at 82% according to Time/CNN13. Such high approval rating meant that Bush had overwhelming influence over the public, and this enabled him to effectively manipulate this influence to gain public support for his NCLB act. People viewed him highly, and thus were more prone to accept and favor the policies he suggested, particularly the NCLB act, which had been the policy he had been promoting most enthusiastically since the beginning of his presidency. This change in the political stream, made the process of coupling of the problem and political streams much easier14. Again, for their own political images, politicians would be more willing to cooperate with the president, and support his agenda. “Leaders want to be seen as facilitating, not hindering15.” Consequently, they would be reluctant to act against the president, especially when such a high percentage of the public approves of his actions, for fear of being labeled as contentious or divisive by the media and suffering.
Now that a policy window had opened, policy entrepreneur President George W. Bush facilitated the coupling of the policy stream with the problem stream. To begin with, he altered and modified the original “Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA)16” in such a way that it was more compatible with and could more effectively address the current modern day problem stream. [The ESEA was an act which attempted to address the national problem of low education performance through the provision of funding for students and schools of low socioeconomic background17. Since 1965, the act had been reintroduced and reauthorized every four or five years, until the Clinton administration during which a divided congress prevented the act from being reauthorized. ] The policy was modified in such a way that it better addressed the growing education problem of socioeconomic discrepancy, and the ineffective management and teacher quality of public schools. The “No Child Left Behind Act” had four main features in which it differed from the original ESEA act, namely "stronger accountability for results, more freedom for states and communities, proven education methods, and more choices for parents18”. It placed greater responsibility on schools for children’s education, but in return provided them with increased funding, and increased freedom in how they spent federal funding19. It also gave parents greater power to choose which charter school or public school their children attended, and provided additional education support for students from low income families who failed to meet state education standards20. The modifications to the policy, gave the NLB policy potential to address all the problems present in the present public education system. Consequently, it was able to be endorsed by Bush as an effective solution to the problem at hand. The details of the NCLB act allowed Bush to convince the public and congress that the policy was an answer to the dilemmas of the public education system, and couple the problem stream with the policy stream. Particularly, the set structured details of the NCLB proved useful to Bush when he was attempting to overcome criticisms from opponents, for he was able to overcome many of the counterarguments proposed by his opponents by arguing that each of the four pillars of the NCLB act would support and strengthen each other, and make sure there are no weaknesses.
Bush also facilitated the coupling of the politics stream with the policy stream. During the Clinton era, main problem with the reauthorizing the ESEA, was the coupling of the politics stream with policy stream. During the Clinton Era with its divided house, the Republican congress believed there was not enough political incentive in cooperating and supporting the democratic president in the field of education21. Subsequently, the policy stream and political stream could not get coupled and the ESEA could not get on the decision agenda. Bush was not faced with a divided house, but his party did not have a clear majority either. During the 107th Congress that assessed the NCLB act, the republicans held a narrow majority in the house, and only 50% in the senate22. In an attempt to successfully couple the political stream to the policy stream, George W. Bush appointed leading democrat Senator T. Kennedy as a major sponsor of the act23, and actively involved him in the its revision and modification process. The bipartisan cooperation, especially during the president’s “honeymoon period” made the democrats more hopeful of change and softened up their partisan opposition. Appointment of senator Kennedy as a leading sponsor of the Act was a wise move, for many of the Democrats were to a degree, still suspicious of Bush and his intentions after the Bush-Al Gore presidential elections incident in Florida24. Kennedy played a crucial role in convincing the democrats to support the Act. The appointment of Kennedy made the policy more compatible with both parties, and paved path for the coupling of the political stream and policy stream which was not possible during the Clinton administration. Additionally, given the overwhelmingly high approval rates during the weeks immediately following nine-eleven attacks, the democrats felt “inclined to give Bush the benefit of the doubt25” with the policies he suggested. As Republican politician Michael Castle admits, “if a president’s sailing along at 80% approval rating, members are going to be very reluctant to say no26”, and this reluctance made Bush’s job of coupling the political stream and the policy stream much easier. Consequently, despite there being a very narrow majority, the act itself passed both house (385-45)27 and senate (91-8) with overwhelming majority28.
The political, problem and policy streams all came together to enable the No Child Left Behind Act to appear on the decision agenda. It seems that changes in the political stream were perhaps the most important of the three streams in enabling the Act to appear on the decision agenda, considering that without it, not only is it unlikely that changes in the policy stream would have occurred, but George W. Bush as a policy entrepreneur, would be missing also. He was largely influential in coupling the three streams together, employing the right people, promoting bipartisan partnership for the sake of common goals, and skillfully manipulating the public’s support.
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Section 2: Political actors
Title: Academics and intellectuals: overdependence on narrow research, idealism, and flaws in the policy
Academics and intellectuals were the main actors who defined and directed the development and creation of the NCLB policy. One inevitably comes to such a conclusion when one examines the structure of the policy and how it was created. I will further argue that much of the failures of the NCLB policy can be attributed to the fact that politicians involved in the drafting process were forced to depend excessively on the information and research provided by academics and intellectuals. Whilst political actors such as the public and the public bureaucrats, namely trade unions, did make a degree of impact in the policy making process, at the core of the process was the academics and the intellectuals.
As Bush promised throughout his presidential campaign, the main aim of the education reform policy, the NCLB act, was to narrow the achievement gap between different socioeconomic, racial and gender classes1. Experts were the main political actors who were largely responsible for structuring the policy output to fulfill this aim. Politicians relied heavily on the intellectuals and academics during the drafting process of the NCLB act for two reasons. Firstly, they lacked expertise2, and secondly, they were in a “race against time” to produce the bill, in an attempt to utilize the president’s honeymoon period to ensure its passing.3. The politicians involved in drafting the bill were President George W. Bush, his administration including Education secretary Margaret Spellings, as well as the “bipartisan four” 4: senator Judd Grett(R) of the Senate Health, Education, Labor and Pensions committee, senator Ted Kennedy (D), Senator John Boehner (R), Chairman of House Education and Work Force Committee, and Senator George Miller(D). Whilst Kennedy was a long time education reform advocate, the majority of the politicians involved, including Spellings, Boehner, and Miller, lacked expertise and previous experience in drafting education policy5. Pressured for time, they had no choice but to base much of their policy on research provided by academics6. Consequently, as a result of these two reasons, academics and intellectuals assumed a key role in determining the public policy making process of the NCLB act and the contents of the final output.
NCLB was partially based on research academics conducted on the education reform strategies instituted by President Bush during his tenure as Texas governor, strategies which showed degrees of success when applied in Texas7. It was also partially based on various education research conducted by politically neutral organizations such as the American Education Research Association and Education Sector8. As Hess claims, “findings from much-heralded experiments turn out to be far less useful guide for policymakers than many hope.9” No matter how accurate or successful the research is, problems arise when the policy creation process relies too heavily on academic. This is because the type of research conducted by academics in the aforementioned organizations are often narrow, focused research evaluating of the effectiveness of a particular policy conducted in a small, controlled setting such as “a particular target school, a district, or several randomly selected schools within a particular state10”. Furthermore, much of the broader, national education reform research provided by the same organizations are outdated and inaccurate, considering that “a nation-wide reform did not occur for more than a decade”, and previous research conducting methods were considered unreliable11. Problems rise when academics and intellectuals are the key political actors in the policy formation process, because their research has evident limitations. When too much focus is placed on the intellectuals, limitations of their research are largely unaddressed in the policy creation process, calling for problems later12.
Academics and intellectuals shaped the NCLB policy to be full of application errors. The degree of, and the type of problems that the NCLB act faced during the policy implementation process, serve as proof of the extent to which academics and intellectuals played a significant role in the policy creation process. The more heavily politicians decided to rely on academics, the more policy will be modeled after academic research, and the more problems and dilemmas it will face when implemented across the nation. The “soft tissue involved in marrying research to policy matters as much as the technical merits of the research itself.13” When politicians rely too much on academics and intellectuals, the overdependence gets in the way of adapting the research information in such a way that it suits the “real world.14” It instead encourages direct application of research to policy which largely discounts the discrepancy between the controlled setting of the research experiment and the real world. The role of research is to “ensure that public decision-making is informed by all the facts, insights and analyses that research can provide15” rather than to “dictate outcomes15,” but overdependence encourages research to do the latter and bestows inordinate influence to the academics, allowing the contents of their research to play a key role in the policy creation process. A secondary consequence is that, since so much focus is placed on the contents of their research, information not mentioned in the research is largely forgotten or never addressed in the policy creation process16.
One factor that academics never accounted for is the problems that would rise from the interaction between neighboring schools of different caliber, both subjected under the same NCLB policy. For example, “in the hypothetical but typical situation, two neighboring schools have different ratings: one passes and one fails. Students from the failing school are allowed to transfer to the passing school17.” The transfer results in the failing school losing its potential for success since its punished with a reduction in funds, and the better school providing its students with poorer quality education. Consequently, the education level in both schools decrease, the education disparity gap does not reduce, and the policy ultimately causes more harm than good. Academics often conducted research in controlled and isolated small-scale settings, and thus mention very little on the consequences of such interaction. It is the job of the lawmaker to consider such application issues, and weave relevant solutions into the policy. However, when experts and their research play such a huge role in the policy creation process, as with the NCLB act, “focus is placed on how to adopt the research strategies as accurately as possible into the policy structure18” that other factors are often never considered. Because research academics focused were on the cause and effect relationship of particular strategies aimed at reducing the performance gap, there was little thought given to the additional consequences of the punitive actions that accompany the cause and effect relationship of the strategies.
Another consequence of experts playing such a major role in the policy development process is that once the policy is implemented, problems will rise from resource limitations that were not taken into account in the research but become a crucial factor in measuring the effectiveness of a policy in society. Since research is often conducted in idealized settings, there is often no limit placed on the amount of resources provided during the experimentation process, discounting the limit placed on the independent variable. For example, if attempting to measure the impact of reducing classroom size (independent variable), factors such as limited funds, high-quality teachers, and resources are not taken into study for sake of accurate measurement. The NCLB act required the creation of statewide-standardized tests that students would take annually in order to measure improvements in performance and punish those who don’t improve. Schools have limited funding and teachers. Faced with the threat of reduced funding or shutdown, instead of improving their quality of teaching, they instead began to “teach the test”, directing all resources towards the specific core disciplines tested, and “neglecting other subjects, sacrificing innovation, and reducing critical thinking skills.19” Because the politicians creating the NCLB policy lacked experience-based application skills of education policy, faced with time pressure, they chose to focus their time and effort on elements addressed in the research. This in effect, meant that problems unaddressed in research were equally neglected in the policy implementation process. As argued by J. Allen20, when there is too much focus on directly adopting research, such “application problems” are often unforeseen or there is not enough resources nor time to be directed towards solving them.
Another problem never addressed in the NCLB policy was that the people’s response to the implementation was never considered by academics, and since their research directed the course of the policy creation process, means of “smooth transition” were never considered. As Schemo21 argues, “whether change is accepted or not is contingent on co-alignment, cooperation and adequate preparation for change at each level.” Academics do not need to address such transition issues, since their aim is to test the effectiveness of a particular strategy. When the policy making process was dominated by experts and their research, such issues fail to be addressed. The
NCLB “has given school districts the responsibility to make the policy happen without simultaneously giving them a comprehensive vision of how such change is to be effected or …he NCLB act has embraced accountability without mentorship and punitive measures without guidance.22” A trend that must be noticed here is that the problems that rise whilst implementing the NCLB act, are those either unaddressed by or irrelevant to the research conducted by academics and intellectuals. From the lack of those issues independent of research contents being addressed, one can estimate the degree of influence experts hold over the policy making process. Because academics and their research dictate the course of policy, whilst the NCLB act has been described as “appearing successful in proposal form” and it has also been admitted as “difficult to realistically implement effectively” for it is limited in its application abilities.
The final reason why the academics were able to assume a central role in the policy output process was because of the limited opposition that the teacher’s unions and associations such as the NEA and the TFA would be able to effectively harbor against the policy. Previously, “virtually all districts of any sizes were successfully organized and collective bargaining was the norm of teachers unions.23” They were able to influence the policy outcome significantly, for they held the resources and money to “shape the schools from top down by influencing the education policies of government and blocking reforms they find threatening to their interests.24” However, with the NCLB act, their usual brunt of influence was greatly reduce due to several reasons. Most important perhaps is the fact that the NCLB act was a bipartisan policy written by a bipartisan group of authors. Consequently, the degree to which teachers unions can control the party decision making process by threatening to switch loyalties from one party to another is very limited, since both parties are supporting the act. The politicians too, aware of the dilemma faced by teachers unions, “largely ignored their angry, discontent objections from the TFA and NEA25” and went ahead with shaping the policies. Since a group which often played a central role in the policy output content was largely absent from the picture, this further focused attention on the research conducted by the experts. It would be inaccurate to completely discount the power of the teachers unions in the policy creation process, since they would be able to influence congress members on a state level through the provision of endorsements and funding to disparate candidates. However, their ability to do show opposition on a state level too, would be limited by the fact that unions need to ensure their “public image is not harmed26”, especially by “vocally outright opposing an act that is strongly supported by the public26”. Subsequently, not faced with the usual opposition, academics and intellectuals ultimately played a greater role in the policy output process.
The NCLB was effective at responding to public’s desire to reduce the education gap between different socioeconomic, racial and gender groups, bringing forth a method to satisfy public desire. Based on this observation, some have attempted to argue that that the public, rather than academics and intellectuals, was the key player in the NCLB policy formation process. However, when one considers the time constraint under which the NCLB was drafted under, the possibility that public opinion was a key player in the policy creation process seems unlikely. Whilst public support for reducing the achievement gap was strong, this contributed more towards placing the policy on the decision agenda rather than the actual structuring of the policy. As identified by Brady, the fact that there is a “correlation existing between public opinion and congressional policy …does not necessarily guarantee a relationship27.”
Three crucial factors significantly weaken the argument that public was a key player in the creation of the NCLB policy. Firstly, public support for education reform was, to a degree, one brought into the spot light and fostered by Bush during his presidential campaign. It is difficult to argue that public’s interest, stirred into action by an external source (Bush), could be focused enough and clear in direction enough to direct the course and details of public policy. Secondly, and more importantly, many elements of NCLB were unique and radical, having never been implemented to such extent previously in America. A subsequent result of this was that there was only limited public opinion data available to base the NCLB policy on. To conduct new research, and draw conclusions from it would be “very time consuming.28” The NCLB policy however, was a legislation drafted, and created within a time period of several months. Finally, “polls are often not clear in what reform is being considered29” and do not provide a realistic perspective of the entire reform policy proposed since factors such as “cost of the reform” and “tradeoffs” are often not considered. Thus to argue that one based the policy creation process on public process would be difficult, especially in the light of the three factors considered above. The general and accepted fact that the public is uninformed and unaware, and unlike the academics, do not have a clear idea of the contents of the policy, nor their wants in the light of tradeoffs and costs of policy implementation.
That experts and not the general public were the key actors in the NCLB policy formation process is further supported by polling results on the NCLB act. Polling results prove that whilst public support for the core aims of the NCLB policy was strong, the public knew little about the actual details of the policy. This suggests that whilst the public held a general idea of what they wanted the future of public education to be, they had no specific idea about how to make sure this ideal is realized in the public education arena. Whilst this strong public support would have been influential in ensuring that the NCLB policy was placed on the decision agenda and passed, it would have played a minor role in determining the nuts and bolts of the NCLB policy formation. Public opinion is not specific nor stable enough to determine the contents of the NCLB policy apart from its general goals. According to a Gallup poll, in the months preceding Bush’s signing of the bill, 82% of the public supported the desire to close achievement gaps between students from different racial, ethnic and class backgrounds. However, the same Gallup poll conducted also revealed that 76% of those surveyed knew very little or nothing about the new law30. Additionally, when the public realized that the state was attempting to improve greater accountability by testing, there was an increase in disagreement about the core elements of NCLB. The public desired to close the achievement gap and this was an end outcome but they didn’t’ like the way that the public policy went. Surely if the NCLB policy was created based on public opinion, the policy would be supported further by the public?
Whilst academics and intellectuals were influential in the creation of the NCLB policy, and the final policy output presented to congress, it played a very limited role in placing the policy on the decision agenda, and getting it passed in Congress. Academics and intellectuals are less likely to impact the decision agenda or congress’ acceptance of the policy than other political actors such as the public or the bureaucracy. For unlike the public who have direct interaction with Congress, intellectuals only interact with the Congress through the policy presented. Congress also has less incentive to interact with intellectuals because their popularity and reelection are much less contingent on experts, as compared to public bureaucrats. However, to argue that intellectuals played no role getting the policy passed by congress would be inaccurate. The nature of the experts, at least indirectly, would have surely contributed to placing the policy on the decision agenda and getting the proposal passed. Namely, much of the research conducted came from politically neutral organizations, and was put together by a bipartisan group. The nature of the intellectuals make partisan politicians more open to the proposed policy, and thus less likely to oppose the act on a purely ideological basis, allowing for smoother acceptance by congress. Safe to say, academics and intellectuals, whilst playing a major role in shaping policy, played a minor role in impacting the outcome of the policy in congress.
To conclude, experts played a central role in the creation of the NCLB policy. The lack of expertise and fieldwork knowledge and the lack of time to draft the proposition, coupled with the limited role of the main opposition to education reform policies, teachers unions, allowed for academics and intellectuals to be the main political actors in the NCLB policy formation process. The excessive dependence of politicians on the research and information provided by experts, is what resulted in such numerous failures of the policy when it was later implemented. The crucial role that experts placed in shaping policy, is one that cannot be substituted by any other groups of political actors, as demonstrated by disproving the argument that public opinion dictated the direction and structure of the policy, and highlighting the limited role that unions were able to play in the policy formation process. Finally, whilst their role in placing the given policy on the decision-making agenda was relatively limited, academics and intellectuals majorly influenced the the policy’s structure and content.
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Section 3: The policy-making institutions
Desperate times call for desperate measures: a time to bend the rules – unorthodox decision making at its best
It is noted that unorthodox procedures are often “responses of members to the problems and opportunities that institutional structure and the political environment present.1” 2001 the first time since 1993 that a republican president was nominated. It was also Bush’s first year in office, the prime of his ‘honeymoon period.’ In response to this change in political environment, the Republican party, and Bush in particular, made the decision to employ unorthodox legislative procedures. The Bush administration and major advocates of the Bill in congress wanted to pass the No Child Left Behind Act as quick as possible to make most of the ideal political climate, and felt that the traditional means of employing legislature would take too long.
Consequently, key endorsers of the NCLB act resorted to unorthodox procedures such as multiple referral and rules procedures in the house, and unanimous consent in the senate to quicken the pace at which the bill will be drafted and passed through the two chambers. Essentially, the unorthodox procedures were implemented in order to “successfully complete a race against time2.” However, whilst the procedures did speed up the process, they did so at the cost of “eroding the efficacy and the efficiency of the bill”3. Education reform, which aimed at reducing the achievement gap, and increasing teacher accountability and choice for students, had been a central part of Bush’s presidential campaign. The public was expectant on education reform, and the sheer amount of media attention too, placed pressure on Bush to create an education reform act as soon as possible4. Whilst Republican Party was the majority party in both chambers during the 107th Congress5, it was only so by a narrow majority. Consequently, a bipartisan agreement was a necessity to pass the No Child Left Behind Act. Much of the unorthodox law making processes placed limited debate to a specified amount of time. Consequently, under the pressure of the procedures, the Republican party gave into negotiations too much, and reconciliation inevitably lead to a “watered down policy which was partially democratic, partially republican, and ineffective as a result.6”
To begin with, bills were drafted by both chambers simultaneously, with the Senate bill being passed in June, and the House bill being passed in May7. These were later combined by the conference committee, who repaired and unified the bill. It was later passed again by both the House and the Senate in December, and signed by Bush on January, 20028. Instead of drafting a bill in one chamber and passing it through the other, drafting both simultaneously allowed time efficiency. It also meant that both chambers to be stimulated by the public attention. Under the expectant eyes of the public and media, negotiation and bipartisanship was more likely in both chambers.
In the House, the Bill was referred to two separate committees – the “House, Education, and the Workforce” committee and the “House Judiciary” committee9. Multiple Referral gave the Speaker of the House Hastert flexibility to shift primary responsibility to a committee that is drafting the bill in a way that was more conducive to obtaining bipartisanship10. Multiple referrals induced both committees to draft a bill that was more conductive to getting passed in the House since both were effectively “competing with one another11” to create the most effective bill. As speculated by Johnson, the bill was likely “intentionally offered to only two committees12” so that the house could “reap the benefits of multiple referral12” but avoid the “extended periods of working out disagreements among the committees.12” In sparking competition between the two committees, multiple referral had an extended impact on making the bill that would be chosen between the two, be the more compromised bill that would be palatable to both Republicans and Democrats ideologically, but lacking substance. Essentially, the end product was a bill largely influenced by the “House, Education, and the Workforce” committee and its chairman Boehner. To ensure that his bill would be the successful one to move forward after multiple referral, Boehner intentionally drafted a bill that would pass through the house and win a bipartisan support, not considering how efficient or impactful such a bill would be when it was actually implemented in America. In an attempt to make the bill “more palatable” to the Democrats, he inevitably made several sacrifices and deviated away from Bush’s original aims13. He became convinced that for the democrats to support “annual testing systems”, the Republicans would need to give ground on vouchers and block grants14. Consequently, in an attempt to maintain Bush’s main agenda of increasing accountability, the issue of school choice was inevitably sacrificed.5” Boehner had achieved bipartisanship, as promised–the final committee vote was 41-716–but with a rather “Democratic flavor” that upset many of his own party members. Effectively, whilst the unorthodox legislative procedure of multiple referrals allowed the quick and efficient drafting of an initial bill, several sacrifices were made in the process, which reduced the overall quality and effectiveness of the bill’s contents because it was forced to become a compromised bill that would win popular support, regardless of the efficacy of its contents.
The special rules was another unorthodox lawmaking feature prevalent in the House Bill drafting process. The House Rules committee intentionally resorted to unorthodox lawmaking procedures, employing a combination of open and closed rules17 to ensure that a bill that would gather maximum support as possible could be finalized. The committee decided to use special rules because they realized that enforcing closed rules on certain sections of the bill that would either unnecessarily cause conflict or never reach a unanimous decision were better left off as closed, whereas other sections that would likely garner more support if modified were left open. Special rules enabled the House to make special provisions to incorporate post committee compromises into the bill18. Rules also enabled key amendments to be debated extensively on the floor, whilst limiting other less significant, or cumbersome amendments to little or no debate to ensure greater bipartisan support of the final bill. Perhaps one consequence of this unorthodox legislation (special rules) was that, with the amendments that were debated, extensive debate gave way to extensive changes in the bill. Many of the key amendments passed – but each amendment watered down the overall effectiveness of the bill in implementing successful education reform. Without directly intending to, unorthodox law making procedures gave way to extensive debate, and in turn, expensive compromise and negotiation which in the end produced a watered down policy. In an attempt to come to a bipartisan agreement, many of the more substantial clauses that required action and sought direct accountability were struck out on the basis that it directly opposed democratic ideologies or was too harsh on the main supporters or interest groups that were represented in the democratic party.
One key amendment, H.RES.14319, debated and passed under special rules, dealt with a section of the bill known as the Adequate Yearly Progress (AYP)20. The bill’s clauses required annual progress by each subgroup of students in a way that all groups would become proficient in ten years. The democrats argued that too many schools would be identified as failing the AYP which would be an expensive and embarrassing label21. The amendment required annual improvement in test scores that should be made each year per group to 1% minimum, and also determined that progress would be judged over a three-year period and the scores of the lowest achieving students would be weighted more heavily, giving schools credit for closing the achievement gap.22 Whilst the amendment still maintained the concept of accountability, it also degraded the quality and standards of accountability.
Another key amendment, H.RES11823, also debated and passed under special rules, had similar consequences. In an attempt to increase accountability of teachers, the original clause called for increased statewise testing. The democrats and republicans held different views about the best means of increasing accountability; the democrats believed that more federal intervention was necessary to ensure effective accountability24. Consequently, compromise was met and an amendment was adopted whereby states had to meet the standards of the National Assessment of Educational Progress, although they were left to identify their own achievement standards and to develop assessments which align with these standards, although they still must meet the standards of the National Assessment of Educational Progress25. The problem with passing such an amendment is: one is essentially “attempting to fulfill a republican goal with a democratic ideal26” Because the bill’s advocates were so absorbed in seeking the approval of both parties, the House approved an amendment appealed to the ideology of both, yet lacked a set method of implementation: how is it possible to federally compare and assess states’ performance standards when each states would be allowed to use different tests in different areas, potentially undercutting their comparability?
The eventual bill that the House had drafted, known as H.R.1. was passed on May 24th 2001, 384-4127. Ironically, more than three quarters of those who had opposed the bill were the Republicans, members of Bush’s own party. The sheer amount of reconciliation that arose from unorthodox legislative procedures displeased the conservative republicans who believed that “the initial plans of educational reform were replaced by meaningless, ineffective measures.” In the perspective of such republicans, unorthodox law making procedures lead to the creation of an bipartisan-ideologically sound, but implementation-wise vague bill that sacrificed too much for the sake of attaining political unity.
The Senate Health, Education, Labor and Pensions committee was responsible for the drafting, reporting and markup of the senate bill s.1, also known as the “Better Education for Students and Teachers Act.” As Sinclar notes, unanimous consent agreement is often agreed upon in the senate for the sake of achieving an “expeditious and orderly consideration of the legislation on the floor.28” Since a time limit is placed on the debate, it prevents unnecessary barriers to passing the bill. Unanimous consent agreement was reached by senators from both parties because they felt pressured to draft an education reform bill in response to the booming public interest in education. After seven weeks of debate on the bill and its amendments, the senate successfully produced the s.1 bill and passed it 91-8 on June 14th29. However, it too, had similar problems as the house bill as a result of extended negotiation and extensive reconciliation.
However, it’s important not to overestimate the power of the unorthodox law making in the bill passing process. How effective unorthodox law making is on ensuring the successful passage of a policy, also depends on other factors, such as “favorable political circumstances of the bill itself, and strong public support.29” This is clearly demonstrated by Clinton’s economic program mentioned by Sinclair30, which would have had no chance of passing without the sheer amount of public support which induced negotiation in congress. There is only so much that unorthodox law making procedures on their own can do, for they are merely procedures that serve a specific purpose – in the case of NCLB their purpose was to quicken the process of drafting and creating the bill so that it may be passed whilst public opinion was favorable. Safe to say, without the strong public attention and support, unorthodox law making legislature may not have helped speed up the process of policy drafting and creation. This is particularly evident, when examining the final part of the policy modification which the Conference Committee had to undergo. Because the bill had gone through the senate and house at the same time, what resulted was a very different senate and house version of the bill. The conference committee had to bridge more than 2,75 divergences between the House and Senate versions. During the summer, “an astounding 39 conferees met daily to hammer out more than 2000 agreements” to finally reach a viable solution for both the senate and the house to vote on again in December.
In the final conference, the divergences between the two bills were so huge that had it not been the extraordinary pressure from the public and support for Bush, unorthodox law making would never have sped up the process of policy creation. The unorthodox law making procedures were dependent on the political climate from which it originated from, to achieve its original purpose of speeding up the policy formation process
To conclude, unorthodox law making procedures allowed the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 to be implemented much quicker than had the congress resorted to traditional policy making procedures. However, in the process, it both encouraged and gave way to extensive reconciliation and compromise, which reduced the effectiveness of the policy’s contents.
***
Concluding Thoughts…
The No Child Left Behind Act was an act passed with extraordinary effort, from the policy entrepreneur President Bush, to the Academics, to those who were implementing unorthodox lawmaking procedures. It was placed on the decision agenda and passed with careful maneuvering, partly by President Bush who played the role of main policy entrepreneur. Public support for the policy was a significant factor that both induced cooperation from politicians, and increased the chances of the policy passing through the congress. The flaws of the policy are ones deeply embedded within the structure of the policy, and can be viewed as either mistakes or sacrifices made from the political actors, as well as the unintended secondary effects of unorthodox law making. However, despite its flaws it still is a revolutionary bill with far reaching impacts.
Citations – section 1
2. http://www2.ed.gov/nclb/overview/intro/guide/index.html
4. J, Kingdon. Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policies. Pg 166
5. J, Kingdon. Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policies. Pg.168
6. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2001/11/04/AR2007110401450_3.html
7. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/onpolitics/transcripts/bushtext022701.htm
8. Baumgartner & Jones. Agendas and Instability in American Politics. pg86
9. http://www.nytimes.com/2003/03/19/nyregion/on-education-a-pervasive-dismay-on-a-bush-school-law.html
10. Baumgartner & Jones. Agendas and Instability in American Politics. Pg 84
11. http://roperweb.ropercenter.uconn.edu/cgi-bin/hsrun.exe/Roperweb/iPOLL/StateId/DimH6AUIS58_kE-5b1Y9gdP4ZZ6Cw-4AIU/HAHTpage/Summary_Link?qstn_id=449387
12. http://roperweb.ropercenter.uconn.edu/cgi-bin/hsrun.exe/Roperweb/iPOLL/StateId/DimH6AUIS58_kE-5b1Y9gdP4ZZ6Cw-4AIU/HAHTpage/Summary_Link?qstn_id=448115
13. http://roperweb.ropercenter.uconn.edu/cgi-bin/hsrun.exe/Roperweb/iPOLL/StateId/Dii9buULeDS_kUAMb11YJJL_ZZ6S--4pz1/HAHTpage/Summary_Link?qstn_id=443883
14. J, Kingdon. Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policies. Page 170.
15. Baumgartner & Jones. Agendas and Instability in American Politics. Pg. 85
16. http://www.gse.harvard.edu/news_events/features/2005/08/esea0819.html
17. http://www.gse.harvard.edu/news_events/features/2005/08/esea0819.html
18. http://www.ehow.com/about_5085381_history-child-left-behind-act.html
19. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/education/policy/nochild/PL107-110.pdf
20. http://www.usatoday.com/news/education/2007-01-07-no-child_x.htm
21. http://www.k12.wa.us/esea/
22. thomas.loc.gov/bss/d107query.html
23. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/11/04/AR2007110401450_3.html
24. http://www.nytimes.com/2001/02/16/us/democrats-cite-haste-in-handling-education-bill.html
Citations – section 2
1. Paige, R. (2005). No Child Left Behind: the ongoing movement for Public Education Reform. Harvard Education Review. Page 34
2. Toch, T. (2001) Bush’s Big Test. The Washington Monthly v33 no 11 page 14
3. Paige, R. (2002) An Overview of America’s education Agenda. Phi Delta Kappan v83 p708
4. Toch, T. (2001) Bush’s Big Test. The Washington Monthly v33 no 11 page 15
5. Paige, R. (2005). No Child Left Behind: the ongoing movement for Public Education Reform. Harvard Education Review. Page 37
6. Fern, E. (2004) NCLB Insights. From www.wpllc.net/publications/NCLBInsight/020504.htm
7. Lewis C. (2002) Where is the NCBLA taking us? Phi Delta Kappan pg5 v84
8. Lewis C. (2002) Where is the NCBLA taking us? Phi Delta Kappan pg5 v84
9. Hess F. (2008) When Education Research matters. Springer Science + business media LLC. Pg 538
10. Fern, E. (2004) NCLB Insights. From www.wpllc.net/publications/NCLBInsight/020504.htm
11. Mefford, D. (2003). Why was No Child Left Behind a failure? http://www.edubook.com/why-was-no-child-left-behind-a-failure/15467/
12. Kennedy, M (2008). How to Fix ‘no child’. Washington post. www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/01/06/nclb.htm
13. Hess F. (2008) When Education Research matters. Springer Science + business media LLC. Pg 537
14. Fuller, B., & Wright, J. (2006). Is the No Child Left Behind Act working? Berkeley: University of California, Berkeley, http://pace.berkeley.edu/pace_publications.html pg 421
15. Hess F. (2008) When Education Research matters. Springer Science + business media LLC. Pg 535
16. Fuller, B., & Wright, J. (2006). Is the No Child Left Behind Act working? Berkeley: University of California, Berkeley, http://pace.berkeley.edu/pace_publications.html pg 422
17. Karp, S. (2004). “The No Child Left Behind Hoax.” Rethinking School. http://www.zmag.org/content/showarticle.cfm?SectionID=37&ItemID=4850
18. Lewis C. (2002) Where is the NCBLA taking us? Phi Delta Kappan pg5 v91
19. Archer, J. (Nov. 19, 2003). Administrators vexed by mandates. Education Week, v.23 issue 12, pg 6.
20. DeWine, M. (2001) Saving our schools: education reform in America. Washington Monthly, page 11
21. Mefford, D. (2003). Why was No Child Left Behind a failure? http://www.edubook.com/why-was-no-child-left-behind-a-failure/15467/
22. Galloway, D. (2004) An Organizational Approach to the No Child Left Behind (NCLB) Act, http://www.aw-wrdsmth.com/6873213/An-Organizational-Approach-to-NCLB.html
23. Moe, T. Union Power and the Children. Chapter 10, pg230
24. Moe, T. Union Power and the Children. Chapter 10, pg233
25. Trubowitz, S (2003). Likely foes of large scale education change. Education Digest Pg12 v66
26. Moe, T. Union Power and the Children. Chapter 10, pg239
27. Brady, D. Public opinion and congressional policy, Hoover Institution, page 11
28. Brady, D. Public opinion and congressional policy, Hoover Institution, page 15
29. Mefford, D. (2003). Why was No Child Left Behind a failure? http://www.edubook.com/why-was-no-child-left-behind-a-failure/15467/
30. Delision, E. (2002) “No Child Left Behind: What It Means to You.” Education World., http://www.educationworld.com/a_issues/issues273.shtml
Citations – section 3
1. Sinclair, Unorthodox Lawmaking, pg. 221a
2. Lewis C. (2002) Where is the NCBLA taking us? Phi Delta Kappan pg5 v18
3. Lewis C. (2002) Where is the NCBLA taking us? Phi Delta Kappan pg5 v26
4. Karp, S. (2004). “The No Child Left Behind Hoax.” Rethinking School. http://www.zmag.org/content/showarticle.cfm?SectionID=37&ItemID=4850
5. The Library of Congress - THOMAS
http://thomas.loc.gov/bss/107search.html
6. Mefford, D. (2003). Why was No Child Left Behind a failure? http://www.edubook.com/why-was-no-child-left-behind-a-failure/15467/
7. National Education Associaton (2004). No Child Left Behind? The Funding Gap in ESEA and Other Federal Education programs. Pg6
8. National Education Associaton (2004). No Child Left Behind? The Funding Gap in ESEA and Other Federal Education programs. Pg8
9. USCongress Votes Database- Washington Post. (2001)
http://projects.washingtonpost.com/congress/107/bills/h_r_1/
10. Sinclair, Unorthodox Lawmaking, pg. 218
11. The Library of Congress – THOMAS – H.R.1 legislation http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d107:HC00289
12. Johnson, M. (2001) Saving our schools: education reform in America. Washington Monthly, page 17
13. Hayes, W. (2008) No Child Left Behind: Past, Present, Future. Page 39
14. Hayes, W. (2008) No Child Left Behind: Past, Present, Future. Page 40
15. Mefford, D. (2003). Why was No Child Left Behind a failure? http://www.edubook.com/why-was-no-child-left-behind-a-failure/15467/
16. The Library of Congress – THOMAS – H.R.1 legislation http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d107:HC00289
17. Hayes, W. (2008) No Child Left Behind: Past, Present, Future. Page 52
18. Hayes, W. (2008) No Child Left Behind: Past, Present, Future. Page 54
19. The Library of Congress – THOMAS – H.RES.143
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/cpquery/6?&sid=TSOPHCkFL&hd_count=500&xform_type=0&maxdocs=500&variant=y&r_t=h&r_t=s&r_t=jc&refer=&r_n=hr069.
20. National Education Associaton (2004). No Child Left Behind? The Funding Gap in ESEA and Other Federal Education programs. Pg12
21. National Education Associaton (2004). No Child Left Behind? The Funding Gap in ESEA and Other Federal Education programs. Pg19
22. The Library of Congress – THOMAS – H.RES.143
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/cpquery/6?&sid=TSOPHCkFL&hd_count=500&xform_type=0&maxdocs=500&variant=y&r_t=h&r_t=s&r_t=jc&refer=&r_n=hr069.
23. The Library of Congress – THOMAS –H.RES118
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/L?d107:./temp/~bdaWsOZ:1[1-28](Amendments_For_H.R.1)&./temp/~bd4uN1
24. Mefford, D. (2003). Why was No Child Left Behind a failure? http://www.edubook.com/why-was-no-child-left-behind-a-failure/15467/
25. The Library of Congress – THOMAS –H.RES118
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/L?d107:./temp/~bdaWsOZ:1[1-28](Amendments_For_H.R.1)&./temp/~bd4uN1
26. Tasci, C.(2003) Changing No Child urged. Daily Bulletin
http://www.dailybulletin.com/ci_15066177
27. The Library of Congress – THOMAS – H.R.1 legislation http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d107:HC00289
28. Sinclair, Unorthodox Lawmaking, pg. 217
29. Fuller, B., & Wright, J. (2006). Is the No Child Left Behind Act working? Berkeley: University of California, Berkeley, http://pace.berkeley.edu/pace_publications.html pg 422
30. Sinclair, Unorthodox Lawmaking, pg. 219
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